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Abstract:  In spite of the fact that almost all the European Union member States have similar princi-
ples of tax justice, there is not an express specification about them in the Primary Law of the Union. The 
institutions of the European Union have some tax competences given by their member States, specially 
highlighting fiscal harmonization of certain state taxes. The tax harmonization directives, despite this lack 
of express specification, cannot forget these principles of tax justice. The argument of the environmental 
taxation of hydrocarbons has been used to increase the fiscal pressure over the gasoline until a point where 
its legitimacy should be discussed, not only from the constitutional point of view, but also from the Euro-
pean Union Treaties. Individual States are not the only ones responsible for this situation but also European 
Union institutions are, since the tax on mineral oils has been harmonized by European Union directives.
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Resumen: A pesar del hecho de que en la mayoría de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea 
existen unos principios de justicia tributaria similares, no existe una especificación expresa de éstos en el 
Derecho Originario de la Unión. Las instituciones de ésta tienen determinadas competencias en materia 
tributaria atribuidas por sus Estados miembros, especialmente en relación a la armonización fiscal de 
ciertos impuestos estatales. Las directivas de armonización fiscal, a pesar de esta falta de especificación 
expresa, no pueden olvidar estos principios de justicia tributaria. El argumento de la fiscalidad ambiental 
de los hidrocarburos ha sido utilizado para incrementar la presión fiscal sobre los carburantes hasta un 
nivel con respecto al cual sería discutible su legitimidad, no sólo desde el punto de vista constitucional, 
sino también desde la perspectiva de los Tratados de la Unión Europea. Los Estados individualmente 
considerados no son los únicos responsables de esta situación, sino que también lo son las instituciones 
de la Unión Europea, desde el momento en que la imposición sobre hidrocarburos se encuentra armoni-
zada conforme a directivas de la Unión.
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I. Introduction
1. Hydrocarbons represent one of the fields in which multi-taxation affects the most. It is neces-
sary to delimit that problem in this context, by determining its own limits, at both internal and interna-
tional levels, thus providing an answer to its current perspectives, particularly in the European context. 
In spite of the fact that almost all the European Union member States have similar principles of tax 
justice, there is not an express specification about them in the Primary Law of the European Union. The 
institutions of the European Union have some tax competences given by their member States, specially 
highlighting fiscal harmonization of certain state taxes. The tax harmonization directives, despite this 
lack of express specification, cannot forget these principles of tax justice.  
2. Although some taxes are described by the legislator as environmental taxes, with the purpose 
of reducing CO2 (carbon dioxide) emissions, the observance of their structures reveals that their princi-
pal purpose is to obtain public revenues. With the excuse of environmental taxation, there are some taxes 
with the single objective to obtain high public incomes.
3. The blame for this situation lies with Member States and European Institutions, because ener-
gy taxes are harmonized by directives at European level. So we have to check if this kind of taxation is 
against tax justice principles. The problem is that in the European Union a definition of these principles 
does not exist. Nevertheless, in European Union Law the property right exists as a fundamental and 
human right. We have to analyze if this kind of taxes represents (or not) an infringement of the property 
right as the origin of some tax justice principles.
II. Environmental taxation and high public revenues
4. Sometimes, on the pretext of “additional taxation”, certain taxes are used only to achieve high 
public revenues. Certain taxes are presented by the tax legislator as environmental taxation, aimed at 
reducing emissions of CO2 (carbon dioxide), although their structure seems to indicate that at the end 
their main purpose is not this, but to get more public revenues.
5. For example, think about the excise duty on hydrocarbons, with regard to the taxation of pe-
trol and diesel fuels. The consumer is to pay indirectly an amount greater than the value of the product 
through taxation. Therefore, the consumer when buying gasoline, pays out a price that is the sum of the 
value of the product and the levy, which represents most of the final amount, including the excise duty 
indirectly charged, and the Value Added Tax.
6. Individual states are not the only ones responsible for this situation but also EU institutions 
are, since the tax on mineral oils has been harmonized by EU directives. However, after all, the Union 
with this type of tax rather than thinking about environmental protection has mainly thought to protect 
free competition in the European petrol and diesel market, with the aim of ensuring that the final price 
of this product would not be too different from one Member State to another. The EU sets a rate or mi-
nimum tax load, which may be increased by the Member states.
7. Pollution control should be achieved mainly through tax breaks for biofuels, and not so much, 
as specified above, with exorbitant tax levies on still needed fuels.
8. Such high taxation on petrol and diesel will eventually cause a damaging effect on the people 
living in areas where there are not many opportunities for public transportation, compared to the inhabi-
tants of big cities. Hence the residents of rural areas are going to pay for this taxation.
9. It has not been proven at all that a higher tax levy corresponds to lower fuel consumption. We 
are talking about products which cannot be set aside in the current way of life. Only the economic crisis, 
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with a decrease in economic, commercial and industrial activities, has succeeded in decreasing the con-
sumption of these products. Not even the rise in the oil price can considerably reduce fuel consumption; 
neither could an increase in taxes could actually reduce it.
10. Then we should wonder whether a tax which is so high is contrary to the material principles 
on tax justice. The problem is that in European Union Law there is not a definition of the so-called prin-
ciples involved. However, in this law, there is a consecration of the right to property as a fundamental 
and human right1. Therefore, we should analyze if these cases of high tax levy represent or not a viola-
tion of the right to property, a right from which in some states the principles of tax justice are deduced.
III. Tax justice and right of ownership
11. The search for tax justice is a pending issue in the process of European integration. However, 
this lacuna may make it difficult for such integration to be built on sufficiently firm legal and economic 
bases. Therefore, the principles of tax justice in European Union Law are still a not fully explored sub-
ject of investigation.
12. The institutions of the European Union hold a series of taxation jurisdictions granted by 
Member States, among them there is particular harmonization of certain State taxes. 
13. The constant tension between direct and indirect taxes affects socio-economic policy, so that 
it is appropriate to identify the constitutional and legislative principles that could in some way limit the 
role of the latter in comparison to the former, and find their basis in EU Law. 
14. Even though in most EU Member States the material principles of tax justice correspond in 
their essential content, to the original EU Law, an explicit statement of those principles does not exit.
15. In Spain, the study of tax law has focused on the primacy of the principles contained in 
paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the Constitution: the tax justice of material principles. Article 131 of the 
Spanish Constitution, at the end of paragraph 1, in relation to income and wealth, proclaims “its fairer 
distribution”. This final declaration sanctions Spain as a “social and democratic Constitutional state”, in 
paragraph 1 of Article 1 of the Constitution. This suggests that the nature of the tax and social justice of 
our state, often poorly analyzed, instead was the object of the first precepts of the Constitution.
16. Reading in conjunction Articles 1.1, 31.1 and 131.1 of the Constitution, it is inferred that in 
a social and democratic constitutional state redistribution of wealth can be implemented through public 
revenue and expenditure. For this reason, before exorbitant fiscal pressures on goods and products, for 
which the price/value of the asset becomes lower than the taxes, there is the need to find a constitutional 
provision that would prevent such excesses. 
17. All this forces us to say that in tax matters we must respect the right to private property, ques-
tioning the maximum tax levy on property, also in relation to the acquisition costs of goods and products.
18. It is obvious that in order to consume a good it is necessary to acquire it: the problem arises 
when the taxation on a good or product obstructs the possibility of acquisition disproportionately and 
unlawfully. One more clarification, when it comes to property, the mind turns to the traditional patterns 
of property of real estate; instead, it is necessary to think that property is a concept applicable to any type 
of product, since, in principle, in order to consume, you must first purchase the property. Therefore, we 
1  Regarding the human rights discipline on a tax law standpoint, see M.T. soler roCh, Deber de contribuir y derecho de 
propiedad en el ámbito de los derechos humanos, Lección Inaugural, Curso Académico 2011-2012, Universidad de Alicante, 
2011, p. 5.
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cannot limit ourselves to state legislation, but must take into account the impact on EU law, as most of 
the indirect taxes are harmonized by the Community. 
19. The concept of non-confiscation does not explicitly appear in the European Community 
discipline, although it should be a fundamental right sanctioned not only in the Constitution, but also by 
the European Community discipline of fundamental rights. 
20. The crisis experienced by the European and world economy has highlighted the need for 
closer economic integration between the Member States of the European Union. There are two essential 
tools to achieve a real economic integration: monetary policy and tax policy. In monetary policy matters, 
greater integration in the Euro zone and a major limitation of the public deficit has been reached. In fiscal 
policy, the rule of unanimity in tax harmonization matters is still applied. Thus, only with the unanimity of 
the representatives of the Member State Governments is it possible to adopt the directives on tax harmo-
nization. This lack of democratic legitimization in the field of tax harmonization, which does not depend 
on the will of the Parliament elected by European citizens, renders even more real the prediction by the 
material principles of tax justice as a limit and guarantee in the tax harmonization for EU Member State 
taxpayers, by virtue of the primacy of its Law with respect to the Law of the Member States. Pursuing the 
contemplation of the material principles of tax justice in tax harmonization seems a necessary step for the 
extension of the powers of the European Union in relation to the tax harmonization mentioned.
21. Then, it must be emphasized that, within the Member States, the development of the material 
principles of tax justice occurred mainly with regard to direct taxes. By contrast, the powers of EU ins-
titutions in the field of tax harmonization essentially concern indirect taxes. Thus, the prediction of the 
material principles of tax justice with respect to tax harmonization would result in the implementation 
of these principles with regard to indirect taxes.
22. There is no express provision for such material principles of tax justice in the original law 
of the European Union, though, as Bosello said, with regard to EU member states “The constitutional 
principles that inspire the tax legislation in individual States are substantially the same”2. However, 
some of these principles might be inferred, as mentioned, from the consecration of the right to property 
as a fundamental right in the original Law. In a way, it would be a parallel process to that achieved by 
the Member States, which have derived some of these principles from the provision of property rights in 
their relative national Constitutions3. This approach would allow observance of the principles of econo-
mic capacity and especially the principle of non-confiscation.
IV. European Union Tax Law and ban of confiscation on in tax matters
23. As a first approximation, we could define the principle of non-confiscation as the duty of 
the tax legislator not to apply taxes that cause the cancellation of the economic capacity of the subject, 
leading to unreasonable taxation. For this reason, non-confiscation could be seen as a manifestation of 
the right to private property in the tax field.
24. Article 31 of the Constitution, paragraph 1, provides that the tax system cannot result in the 
confiscation of property. At the same time, the tax system should be set according to the parameters of 
equality and progressiveness, the “guiding” principles of it. On the other hand, Article 33 guarantees 
2  F. Bosello, Costituzioni e tributi negli Stati della Comunità economica europea, Rivista trimestrale di Diritto e proce-
dura civile, nº 2, 1959, p. 1513.
3  An important benchmark about comparative law of tax justice principles could be the German law. In this respect, regard-
ing the German constitutional case law see P.M. herrera Molina, Una decisión audaz del Tribunal Constitucional Alemán: el 
conjunto de la carga tributaria del contribuyente no puede superar el 50% de sus ingresos. Análisis de la Sentencia del BverfG 
de 22 de junio de 1995 y de su relevancia para el ordenamiento español, Impuestos, II, 1996, p. 1033.
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the right to private property and shows at the same time its social function. This social function can be 
observed from many points of view, one of which, without a doubt, is the duty to contribute.
25. The doctrine, though with varied forms, has recognized the link between the ban on confis-
cation and the right to private property4.
26. Both concepts are defined in two different precepts of our Constitution. The question should 
be whether this means that they have different or distant meanings, when we consider tax matters. In 
our opinion, the answer to this question must be negative, and a link between the two concepts or ideas 
has to be recognized.
27. From a purely technical legal point of view, in a more rigorous and systematic way, it would 
not be possible to think that two provisions can say the same thing, because one of the two would be 
unnecessary and normally the legislator, or in this case the constituent, does nothing useless. Thus, one 
might say that two different rules have to identify two different concepts.
28. The concept of private property is actually a general concept that is applicable in all branches 
of law, and thus in tax matters. If so, you might think that the general consecration of the right to private 
property would be sufficient to prevent taxes taking on a confiscatory character. So, what advantage 
would there be to have an express provision of non-confiscation? Would it have a different meaning?
29. The jurisdiction of European Union institutions on taxation essentially concerns indirect 
taxes, although there are certain Community provisions relating to direct taxes.
 
30. The Law under the legislation enactment of the EU institutions has to respect the postulates 
sanctioned by the regulations of the original law of the Union. Actually, we do not find, in the cited origi-
nal law, an express manifestation of the essential principles in the field of tax justice. However, nothing 
prevents the principle of non-confiscation being inferred from some provisions of the original law of the 
European Union, and in particular from the right to private property.
31. Basically, as concerns tax matters, it is possible to identify a dual line of protection against 
violations of these principles, deriving both from state regulations and from Community regulations. 
Consequently, in the presence of violations of these principles, alongside the possibility to bring the 
action before the Constitutional Court of each state, within the Community, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union would have competence on the matter of tax harmonization or proper Union resources.
32. A first analysis could lead us to define the principle of non-confiscation in tax matters as the 
duty of the tax legislator not to set taxes that lead to a levy which can wipe out the economic possibilities 
of the subject, and that would result, therefore, in unreasonable taxation.
33. When we speak of a tax that wipes out the economic possibility of the subject we do not 
intend to refer to a tax which allows the subject to have only the minimum subsistence. As a matter of 
fact, we believe that in order for the levy to be legitimate, what is left in the hands of the subject after the 
levy should be as close as possible to the economic result of his or her productive capacity (meant as a 
capacity to produce revenue) and never less than the amount of the tax collected in respect of the parti-
4  C. palao TaBoada, La protección constitucional de la propiedad privada como límite al poder tributario, in Hacienda y 
Constitución, Madrid, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, 1979, pp. 319-320; G. núñez pérez, La prohibición constitucional de trib-
utos confiscatorios: dos supuestos, Impuestos, nº 22, 1991, p. 8; L. sánChez serano, Principios de Justicia Tributaria, Capítulo 
IV del Manual General de Derecho Financiero, Tomo Segundo, Derecho Tributario. Parte General. Granada, Comares, 1996, 
pp. 91-92; G.J. naveira de Casanova, El principio de no confiscatoriedad. Estudio en España y Argentina. Madrid, Mc-
Graw-Hill, 1997, p. 448; L.M. Cazorla prieTo, Derecho Financiero y Tributario (parte general), Navarra, Aranzadi, 2000, p. 
112; F. GarCía dorado, Prohibición constitucional de confiscatoriedad y deber de tributación, Madrid, Dykinson, 2002, p. 90.
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cipation in the maintenance of public expenditure. In this regard sometimes the doctrine, in our opinion, 
has been extremely restrictive in identifying the economic resources that should be legitimately left over 
for the taxpayer as a result of the tax levy.
34. As we will see later, the consecration of the right to private property sanctioned in the Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union goes in this direction.
V. Non-confiscation in tax matters and the fundamental right to private property
35. In our opinion, in virtue of what was claimed above, non-confiscation on taxation matters 
presents itself as a manifestation of the right to private property5 in the tax matter.                                             
36. The Constitutions of European states expressly consecrate the fundamental right to private 
property in the tax law. We believe that the ban on confiscation should be linked to the right to private 
property. 
37. Yet, we must wonder whether the right to private property, which is a general right valid for 
the different branches of the legal system, may also be relevant in the field of taxation. If so, it might be 
thought that the general consecration of the right to private property would be sufficient to prevent taxes 
from producing effects of confiscation. 
38. Non-confiscation can be understood as a limitation to taxation which presupposes respect 
for private property in the tax law. 
39. Private property plays a social function, and tax law must implement a redistributive function 
of the wealth of a social and democratic state of law. Therefore, although the tax levy necessarily im-
plies a limitation of private property, that levy, in order to be legitimate, cannot completely empty of 
content the right to property. The levy may limit private property, but it should not completely destroy 
its contents. In other words, the tax levy may limit the property only up to a certain limit. What is this 
limit? The one determined by a threshold of maximum taxation which, if exceeded, would affect the 
very nature of property debasing the private-law content.
40. To put it differently, State constitutions give property an essentially private-law qualifica-
tion. This is to say that the property and its use must be valid to a greater extent for the taxpayer than for 
the State. If not, the provisions of the right to private property in the constitutions would have no sense.
41. Private property of the taxpayer cannot have too public a projection; the goods and rights of 
the taxpayer should never be at the service of the tax authorities to a greater extent than at the service of 
the taxpayer. This rule would be violated by a tax system that imposes a confiscatory levy type.
42. We could just say that if the State6 took over 50 percent of the income, we would be in the 
presence of confiscatory taxation, as in the pockets of the taxpayers there would remain a quantum in-
ferior to the revenue of the State. The same thing would occur, in consumption taxes, if in purchasing a 
good, the taxpayer ended up sustaining tax of more than half of the final price of the goods (tax inclu-
ded); for example, if the product cost 100 € and more than 50 of these corresponded to value added tax 
and excise duties, we would be dealing with a confiscatory situation, in principle.
5  The right to property is born in the civil field, it is consecrated in the constitutional field and it is used in the taxation field. 
On the relations between civil law and tax law, see M.C. freGni, Obbligazione tributaria e codice civile, Torino, Giappichelli, 
1998, pp. 6-9. 
6  And, of course, other public bodies.
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VI. Private property in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the mate-
rial principles on Tax Justice
43. The prohibition on confiscation in the European tax system could be derived from the pro-
tection of private property in the European Union. Within Union Law, there is a consecration of the right 
to private property although not even in this field is protection of the principle of non-confiscation in 
the tax system expressed. Consecration of the right to private property as part of European Union law, 
can be identified from jurisprudence of the EU Court of Justice, which has claimed that the general 
principles and fundamental rights in the Constitutions of the Member States are an integral part (also) of 
European Union law. In addition, there is the consecration of the right to private property contained in 
the European Charter of Fundamental Rights. In this Charter, the right to property is covered aseptically, 
without being classified as private. Yet, the context, in which it appears, leaves no doubt that the mea-
ning of the EU provision refers to private property as the essential core of the right to property.
44. The draft treaty by which the intention was expressed to subscribe to a Constitution for Euro-
pe, later replaced by the Lisbon Treaty (from which the content of this Charted has been deleted), sanctio-
ned in Paragraph 1, Article II-17, stated that: Everyone has the right to own, use, dispose of and bequeath 
his or her lawfully acquired possessions. No one may be deprived of his or her possessions, except in the 
public interest and in the cases and under the conditions provided for by law, subject to fair compensa-
tion being paid in good time for their loss. The use of property may be regulated by law in so far as it is 
necessary for the general interest. In any case, it is possible to find a similar text in paragraph 1 of Article 
17 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, both in the 2000/C 364/01 version, and 
in the 2007/ 303/01 version, solemnly proclaimed on 12th December 2007, the day before the signing of 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Thus, the content of the mentioned Charter has attempted to incorporate the text of 
the draft of European Constitution, which never came to light. However, although this has not been well 
understood, the Treaty of Lisbon, as we shall see below, provided an express reference to the provisions 
of the mentioned Charter. On the other hand, in the fifth paragraph of the Preamble of the Charter it is 
stated that: This Charter reaffirms, with due regard for the powers and tasks of the Community and the 
Union and the principle of subsidiarity, the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional tra-
ditions and international obligations common to the Member States, the Treaty on the European Union, 
the Community Treaties, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted by the Community and by the Council of Europe and the case-law 
of the Court of Justice of the European Communities and of the European Court of Human Rights.
 
45. Together with this, and well beyond Community legislation, it must be noted that Additional 
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights7 establishes in the first paragraph of Article 1, 
that “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions stating later 
that “No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions 
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law”. The second paragraph of the same 
Article provides that “The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State 
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general 
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties”. This article is entitled with 
the inscription “Protection of Property”. The fact that, this article, has to do at the same time with private 
property and taxes, does not mean that taxes are able to render property meaningless, as this would be, ob-
viously, against the recognition of the protection of private property sanctioned in the very Convention.8
46. At the same time, it must be noted that the Treaty on the European Union already established 
in the first paragraph of Article 6, that “The Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, res-
7  A treaty provided for also in the Treaty of Lisbon, as we will see.
8  Among the explanations on the Charter of Fundamental Rights (2007 / C 303/02), in the penultimate paragraph of the 
explanation on the “right to property” it is stated that this law has the same extension and meaning as the one guaranteed by the 
ECHR.
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pect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the 
Member States”. It is then stated in the second paragraph of the same article that “The Union shall respect 
fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional 
traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law”. Paragraph 8 of Ar-
ticle 1 of the Treaty of Lisbon (signed in Lisbon on December 13 of 2007), which amended the Treaty 
on the European Union along with the founding treaty of the European Community, rewrote article 6 
of the Treaty on the European Union. Following this change, in the first line of paragraph 1 of Article 6 
of the Treaty on the European Union it was stated that “The Union recognizes the rights, freedoms and 
principles enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union on 7 December 2000, 
as adapted on 12 December 2007 in Strasbourg, which has the same legal value as the Treaties”. In para-
graph 2 of the new version of Article 6 it is also stated that “The Union shall accede to the European Con-
vention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect 
the Union’s competences as defined in the Treaties”. Finally, paragraph 3 of the amended Article 6 of the 
Treaty states that “Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common 
to the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law”.
47. Focusing, specifically, on the issue of fundamental rights with regard to the right to priva-
te property, it is useful to start from the Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union of 13 
December 1979 (Case 44/79), and the more recent judgment of the same Court of 10 July 2003 (Joined 
Cases C-20/00 and C-64/00). In these judgments it was declared that “fundamental rights form an integral 
part of the general principles of law which the Court ensures compliance and that, for that purpose, the 
Court draws inspiration from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States and from the 
guidelines supplied by international treaties for the protection of human rights on which the Member Sta-
tes have signed or cooperated in,” adding further that “ECHR has, in this regard, special significance.”It is 
necessary to highlight, along with the other fundamental rights thus protected, the importance of the right 
to property, and also, according to the quoted judgments, that in the exercise of fundamental rights some 
restrictions would be allowed only if “they do not constitute, with regard to the aim pursued, a dispropor-
tionate and intolerable interference, impairing the very substance of those rights.”
48. Although in European Union Law the principle of non-confiscation in tax law is not ex-
pressly sanctioned, the right to private property is definitely recognized. Prohibition for Community 
rules to imply confiscatory situations in tax law therefore arises from the will to enforce the respect of 
the right to private property, which is also enacted, as we have stated, by the Community legal discipline. 
Moreover, contemplation of a fundamental right like this must be considered part of the original law of 
the European Union, to which its derived legislation must necessarily be subordinated. 
49. It follows that the tax laws enacted by the Community institutions, whether they are intended 
to regulate the European Union’s own resources or to regulate EU tax harmonization, will never produce 
a content that produces confiscation effects in tax matters; if that were the case, it would violate a fun-
damental right of the European Union.
50. As long as in the original law of the European Union, there is not an express provision of 
the material principles of tax justice that could protect European taxpayers and curb the excesses of tax 
harmonization, protection of taxpayers will not rest on solid foundations. To ensure the protection of the 
taxpayer and to build solid fiscal harmonization it is necessary to establish the principles of the original 
law of the Union. To do this a reform of the EU treaties is needed. Currently, within the original law of 
the European Union the main treaties are the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functio-
ning of the European Union. In view of its content, it could be said that the latter treaty is the most likely 
to provide the express statement of the material principles of tax justice in European Union Law.
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VII. Rational solutions
51. Under the legitimacy of some goal framed in the Constitution, although unrelated to the need 
for tax revenues, occasionally legislature reaches levels of indirect taxation apparently too high. Thus, it is 
necessary to determine what quantitative limit can be derived, even in such cases, from the material prin-
ciples of tax justice. Defining limits in this regard may help to curb indirect versus direct taxation, making 
our tax system more progressive and thus more fair, in light of the constitutional principles of tax justice.
52. Article 31 of the Spanish Constitution, a predicate of the tax system, expresses the principle 
of non-confiscation, which would play its role in relation to this system as a whole, beyond all taxation.
53. However, at the same time we have seen the bond that exists between the ideas of non-
confiscation in tax matter and of private property. Their interpretation will always have to be realized 
from the perspective of justice, since this, beginning from the title of “just” which appears explicitly in 
the aforementioned precept of the Constitution, becomes a value in itself on tax matters, solving possible 
doubts in the articulation of the other Principles. However, no matter how uncertain in itself the idea of 
justice may be, there are some elements which obviously could not be disregarded as a whole, such as 
the ideas of logic and rationality. The “just” will be increasingly likely to appear as illogical or irrational. 
54. As we said, in relation to the tax system, we talk about “system” and “just” in our Constitu-
tion. Those requirements, contained in the first paragraph of art. 31 of the quoted text of the Constitution, 
can be satisfied only by the rationality of the organization of the different tax laws. 
55. In the analysis of the idea of  rationality in relation to the tax system it is necessary to start 
from the considerations by Sainz de Bujanda, which necessarily must be considered here. This scholar 
distinguishes between an “internal rationality” and an “external rationality.” He indicates that “a tax sys-
tem is rational only if, giving internal rationality to each individual tax; it aims to associate it with exter-
nal rationality, that is, its ability to combine harmoniously with the remaining charging procedures that 
integrate together.” This author stresses that “the external rationality of a tax is its capacity to integrate 
into the system, without breaking the rationality of the latter, which happens if any of the taxes which 
compose it, added to the others, destroys the basic objectives of the system, and so violates the general 
principles of tax justice.” He adds that “the technique to achieve this external rationality is that the legis-
lator, when he determines any tax or substantially changes an existing one, verifies with rigor if it may 
be integrated in the whole without problems.” All this leads to the affirmation that “rationality can-not 
in any way be separated from the value of “justice” nor from other requirements associated with this, 
such as security and certainty.” In this way, this author notes that “a tax system, in fact, is rational only 
if it is right and it can be right only if it conforms to the basic and main regulations of the positive order, 
contained in the Constitution, and to the general principles of law, principles of natural law tradition”9.
56. These words contain considerations that have necessarily to be taken into account.
57. Compared to the two perspectives of rationality mentioned, internal and external, the latter 
is the one most directly connected with the idea of the system, even though neither of them can be re-
cognized of course in the realization of tax system.
58. If we really want the tax system to be precisely this, it cannot only consist of an accumu-
lation of taxes, but also of harmonious interweaving of them. To the extent that it is not a mere sum of 
taxes, but also a harmonious set of these, rationality will be much greater and, in its working, as we have 
seen, the justice which must prevail in the tax system will be even greater.
9  F. sainz de Bujanda, La Contribución Territorial Urbana. Trayectoria histórica y problemas actuales. Valencia, Consejo 
General de Cámaras de la propiedad urbana de la Comunidad Valenciana, 1987, pp. 5-15.
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59. Analysis of whether a tax system as a whole is confiscatory or damages the overall ability 
of the subject can be difficult. It must start from compliance with the constitutional principles of tax 
justice of each tax in particular. Later, it has to move on to analysis of conformity with the Constitution 
regarding the confluences of taxes on the same manifestation of economic capacity and, thus, of cases 
of multiple taxation on the same subject.
60. From the analysis of a single tax we would move on to the taxes added to it. This allows us 
a more precise and rigorous review and observation of the justice on tax system justice as a whole. As a 
result of this analysis specific cases of unconstitutionality could be highlighted or we could understand 
that there are none. However, what would be proven would be possible situations that, even keeping 
within the precise limits of the constitution, would come close to the limit of the rationality, the syste-
matic nature, of the good technique and of the order of the tax system as a whole.
61. Therefore, we consider that a useful technique for the analysis of the rationality and cons-
titutionality of the tax system is to begin from the rationality and constitutionality of each taxation 
and subsequently to move on to investigation of the implications of the technical appropriateness and 
constitutionality of cases of multiple taxation, as a confluence of certain taxes, thus contributing to the 
understanding and consideration of a more rational tax system as a whole. 
62. It may happen that each aspect of the tax system individually taken, apparently responds to 
the principle of economic capacity. However, against unreasonable accumulation of taxes, the tax sys-
tem as a whole could levy on the subject a higher contribution to public expenditure than the one they 
would pay on the basis of their global economic capacity, reaching confiscatory limits. 
63. On the other hand, Moschetti explains that elements of rationality are coherence between 
the objectives that the legislator has set and the means used to achieve these aims, consistency between 
individual provisions and the system in which the rules are set, proportionality between the means and 
the purposes, and proportionality between loss of a legal value and satisfaction of other legal values10.
64. Thus, when the legislator pursues an apparent extrafiscal end, very often it leads to an illogi-
cal situation, when the means used do not help to reach that objective, as we have already had occasion 
to point out.
65. So ideas of rationality and justice should preside over interpretation of the ideas of non-
confiscation and private property in tax law. In this way, the application of these ideas, which do not 
prove rational, are unlikely to be considered right.
66. It is very difficult to determine whether the tax system as a whole is or is not confiscatory. 
In relation to what was said above, all taxes (not only direct ones) above 50% of the total income of 
the subject would begin in principle to clash with the patterns that today social consciousness would 
recognize as rational.
67. However, as we said, applying this limit of 50% to the tax system as a whole can be very 
difficult in relation to the variety of situations that may be occur in real life, and especially compared to 
combined direct and indirect taxation. A subject may pay tax that is more than 50% of his or her income 
and in his on her life, not perform actions of consumption that submit him or her to sustain for these a 
greater tax burden than the value of what he or she buy for consumption. Moreover, we could find other 
subjects whose overall contribution for all direct and indirect taxes does not exceed 50% of their income 
and for whom it is usual to perform actions of consumption where the tax burden incurred for these is 
higher than the value of what they buy for consumption.
10  F. MosCheTTi, La razionalità del prelievo ed il concorso alle spese pubbliche, Le ragioni del Diritto Tributario in Europa 
(Giornate di Studi per Furio Bosello), Università di Bologna, www.berliri.giuri.unibo.it, 2003, p. 4.
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68. Hence, in the search for demarcation of the principle of non-confiscation, seeking that ra-
tionality we talked about and implementing a fair tax system, we have to start through the analysis of 
every tax and the set of taxes on the same wealth. Then, regarding neither this rationality; nor the tax 
system as a whole nor any tax considered individually or situations of accumulation of taxes on the same 
manifestation of economic capacity will prove to be confiscatory or to damage private property rights 
in tax matters.
69. Consequently, the resolution of situations of conflict regarding non-confiscation in tax mat-
ters, complying with the idea of private property in the most rational possible form, should start by exa-
mining each tax, determining whether it is confiscatory or not, and then, if not individually found to be 
confiscatory, we should evaluate the accumulation of tax on a single manifestation of wealth. Later, once 
its confiscatory nature was determined, its unconstitutionality would be clear, although the tax system 
as a whole did not reach the limit described above. And, before that, if the tax system as a whole, with 
a large majority of taxpayers, exceeded the aforementioned limit, the system would largely suffer from 
being confiscable and thus, unconstitutional, although its taxes or partial accumulations did not give this 
appearance examining them individually.
70. Specifying all the stated ideas and the limits of what the tax system as a whole can expect, 
the tax on some consumptions may already be confiscatory. Therefore, in relation to the consumption of 
each type of good, in particular, we must proceed by determining whether each tax individually conside-
red can be confiscatory and then evaluate the accumulation of taxes, that is, the circumstances of double 
or multiple taxation on each consumption and in particular whether they can be confiscatory. To this 
end, neither each tax individually considered nor the set of taxes on consumption of any type of goods 
can be a greater tax burden than the value of what enters the assets of the subject, which is what can be 
consumed. A violation of this limit implies rupture of the idea of private property. In order to consume 
it more than twice what enters would outflow. Public finance would take away more than what we have 
acquired is worth, and property would become more public than private. This would be something irra-
tional and, as such, clearly unfair.
71. According to what has been said, we mean that there should be a limit on non-confiscatory 
taxation on consumption, and thus respect for the right of private property in this area of taxation, exa-
mining it not only in reference to consumption in general in its totality, but also in relation to the con-
sumption of each type of good whose taxation in itself could be identified as confiscatory.
72. Excise duties were born with an intended extra fiscal purpose, looking for a higher tax burden 
for certain consumptions which the governments were trying to limit, thus making up for their high social 
cost or environmental impact. What happens is that this tax burden, higher because of certain specific 
consumption through excise duties, should be added to the tax burden by consumption itself, as any pro-
duct or service in general, through
73. Value-Added Tax. What really happens is that in the latter tax you must pay not only for the 
price of the consumed product itself, but also for the tax burden which has represented the corresponding 
excise duty, with the exception of the excise duty on certain means of transport. 
VIII. Excise duties
74. In the perspective of the EU legal system, the debate concerning the current issues of the 
excise duties is normally focused on two points. On the one hand, the question is if these indirect taxes 
are compatible or not with their non-tax rationale of the protection of the environment. On the other, we 
find the consideration that the lack of a tighter fiscal harmonization of these taxes in the EU could imply 
an issue for the free competition in the Member States, considering that some differences on the taxation 
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of the energy or of the energetic products between the single States cold distort the competition, pushing 
the companies that have to consume a lot of energy to establish themselves in other countries, where 
the  taxation on the energy is lower.
75. In other cases, however, the creation of new indirect taxes on specific consumptions by the 
European countries, out of the category of the harmonized excise duties, rises the discussion over this 
new indirect taxes, concerning their compatibility with the Value- Added Tax, regulated also by the arti-
cle 401 of the Directive 2006/112/CE of the Council, of the 28th November 2006, related to the common 
system of the Value-Added Tax. This directive replaced the former Sixth VAT Directive; specifically, the 
article 401 of the Directive 2006/112/CE replaced the well-known article 33 of the former Sixth VAT 
directive in a similar way.
76. The EU Commission through different proposal for directives, tried to harmonise the in-
direct taxes on the circulation of the vehicles in the Union, with the purpose of adapting further these 
indirect taxes to the protection of the environment, taking into consideration the CO2 emissions of the 
vehicles. Pursuing the same perspective, the Commission made as well an effort to abolish the registra-
tion taxes, but even after a transitionary period, still hasn´t reached its goal.
77. At the same time, the EU Commission also tried to raise the minimum harmonized tax rates of 
the fuels on the tax on hydrocarbons in the Member States, but also this go as hasn’t been achieved, yet.
78. Facing some indirect taxes like the excise duties where the tax rate is remarkably high, the 
lack of a consolidated European doctrine on the subjects of the principles of tax justice and, more spe-
cifically, of tax harmonization is even more noticeable.
79. Excise duties were born with an intended extra fiscal purpose, looking for a higher tax bur-
den for certain consumptions which the governments were trying to limit, thus making up for their high 
social cost or environmental impact. What happens is that this tax burden, higher because of certain 
specific consumption through excise duties, should be added to the tax burden by consumption itself, as 
any product or service in general, through Value-Added Tax.
80. What really happens is that in the latter tax you must pay not only for the price of the con-
sumed product itself, but also for the tax burden which has represented the corresponding excise duty, 
with the exception of the excise duty on certain means of transport. We would be dealing with a problem 
in relation with Excise Duties on Fabrication and the Excise Duty on Coal.
IX. Realization of the parameters of the current non-taxation purposes
81. It may be difficult to find an indirect tax that has a purely non-taxation purpose, i.e. a tax 
through which the tax legislator tries to limit, or even remove, the activities harmful for the environment, 
the health or any other value constitutionally guaranteed. Indeed, the indirect taxes tailored as taxes that 
have a purely non-taxation purpose, normally, or even primarily, have a clear tax collection function. 
Among these, many of them apply to products connected to the old tax monopolies existing before 
the accession of a Member State to the European Communities. In particular, these are products that 
generate plentiful tax revenues which the tax legislator does not want to lose. In relation to these taxes, 
therefore, non-taxation models pertaining to the indirect taxes that purely has non-taxation purpose are 
not in line with the political / social purposes that such taxes should put in place, due to the great role of 
the taxation and of its collecting tax function mentioned above. In addition, the European Union, when 
it comes to harmonize the indirect taxes to which the referred products are subjected to, mainly try to 
avoid problems of tax free competition between Member States instead of finding a really non-taxation 
purpose. These can only lead to a non-taxation policy without coherency in its development which does 
not cease to be a mere excuse to keep an excessive taxation.
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82. The principles of tax justice should apply also to a tax that has a non-fiscal purpose though 
this does not always happened. Moreover, the fact that these taxes are usually indirect taxes and that – in 
these cases – the principles of tax justice do not apply adequately (and even less in the European law), eli-
minate useful parameters that could be used for the implementation of these taxes. Also for these reasons, 
the implementation of a system of taxes that have a purely non-fiscal purpose may be difficult to set up.
83. The non-tax purposes do not have to respect only the constitutional discipline, but also the 
European one.
84. In most countries, when the tax system becomes confiscatory has not been specified. The 
few attempts to specify when the prohibition of confiscation is violated have focused primarily on direct 
taxes, which are those that can be more adjusted to progressivity. The greater weight of direct taxes –
mainly of progressive direct taxes– than the indirect ones –essentially proportional– is what can help 
ensure the tax system as a whole to act progressively. This requires moving towards a specification of 
the principle of non-confiscatory in relation to indirect taxation, as a limit to this and, thus, as an impulse 
to greater progressivity of the tax system.
85. In some way it could be said that the legal certainty of the European Union taxpayer does not 
conform to the schemes of modern constitutional States. The tributary systems of the different States neces-
sarily are shaped from the basis of the principles contained in their Constitutions, essentially their material 
principles of tax justice. These should be dealt with both in their specific configuration, where appropriate 
in the corresponding constitutional text, and in the deduction of them made by constitutional jurisprudence, 
sometimes starting from the constitutional recognition of fundamental rights. If European Union law aspi-
res to further development and legitimacy, it should necessarily start from the articulation of principles of 
tax justice in the discipline of the Union. In the absence of a European Constitution, the deduction of such 
principles is only possible from the fundamental rights included in the law of the Union. Moreover, even 
the failed draft European Constitution did not expressly address this need. Later, in the norms derived from 
Treaty of Lisbon neither the Treaty of the European Union nor the Treaty on the Functioning of the Euro-
pean Union addressed expressly this need. Only by laying solid foundations in this respect, a harmonized 
European tax system will be legitimately achieved to be developed on such foundations.
86. The fiscal harmonization in the European Union is principally centred in the indirect im-
position. At the same time, the principles of tax justice are found less developed -in the doctrine and 
in the constitutional jurisprudence of the States- on the themes of the indirect taxes, also considering 
what happens with the subject of the direct taxes. To this we have to add that neither in the Treaty on 
the European Union neither in the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union, we find an express 
consecration of these principles. To all of this we need to think also to the equilibrium that has to exist, 
for some of the indirect taxes that are subject to fiscal harmonization, to respect both the principles of 
tax justice and the non-tax purposes of the environmental protection that the institutions are trying to 
pursue. Against this background, there are not some clear parameters that could be used as limits in the 
activities of the European Union in this area and the solution could be found in the interpretation of the 
discipline of the fundamental rights from the taxation perspective. Facing some indirect taxes like the 
excise duties where the tax rate is so high, is even more evident the lack of a consolidate doctrine in the 
European Union on the subjects of the principles of tax justice.
X. Ethics and Environmental Tax Law from a globalized perspective
87. Discussing ethics in terms of Environmental Tax Law brings about a much broader thematic 
scope, such as the connection between Ethics and Rights, Moral Norms and Legal Norms, which already 
is a difficult topic to deal with. We would obviously be looking for Social Ethics (or a Social Morality) 
beyond Personal Ethics (or a Personal Morality), but it is not easy to find Social Ethics of wide dissemi-
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nation. There could be as many Social Ethics as different societies or (as many) as social groups within 
a society.  
88. All this situation becomes more complicated when we look at the International Society, sin-
ce apart from it being difficult to find shared ethical aspects in the various societies within the various 
Member States of the International Community, it is also hard to find unequivocal ethical aspects at the 
(lower) level of geographic areas which group the various Member States. 
89. It sometimes seems almost impossible to find common ground in the combination of Ethics 
and Rights when we add the problems of separating Ethics and Religion and the fact that there are far 
more widespread religions in the Western world and other religions in the Eastern or South-Eastern 
world. Whenever some religion does not value the Right to Life enough, without which the rest of the 
Rights could lose their meaning, it seems hard to think of finding a basic International morality. Thus, it 
would obviously be more difficult to find an International law morality and far more difficult to find an 
International environmental law morality.
90. The relationship between the person and the environment is something that can, to a large 
extent, arise from individual sensitivity, which goes much further than the morals of the International 
Community’s different geographical areas. As a result, a specific social group within a particular geo-
graphical area can develop Environmental Sensitivities.
91. Furthermore, the different economic options or economic ideologies and, ultimately, the 
great options or alternatives to socio-economic policy can indubitably influence the different options for 
environmental policy.
92. Although globalization is often seen as an economic issue, it could also be seen differently. 
Thus, it could be considered to be not only economic but also cultural or social. An example for this 
could be the obviously positive effects of using rightly understood globalization to improve women’s 
rights in some geographical areas at international level.
93. Often, some of the very influential States manage to impose, at a global level, globalized 
behavioral economics, yet they fail to take into account the importance of environmental sensitivities. 
Obviously, Environmental protection involves significant costs and an apparent income loss, in appro-
priate legal and economic terms.
94. But this financial cost is merely apparent and short-term, since climate change impacts can 
be unpredictable or at least known to be negative, even negative from an economic perspective. Evi-
dently, one of the best future investments will be an environmental investment. 
XI. States, governments, law-makers and tax-payers
95. The only way to find a meeting place legitimately shared by all within the international 
community could eventually lead us towards the field of fundamental rights or, at least, as part of these, 
of those we may rightly call human rights.
96. The tax-paying citizen cannot renounce their fundamental rights. The State has to respect 
their fundamental rights. Constitutional tradition of fundamental rights fused with the legal corpus of 
the European Union.
97. The law-maker can only charge the full weight of environmental tax treatment on the tax-pa-
yer to the extent that it respects their fundamental rights. Within these rights we find the right to property.
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98. It is the Government’s duty to find ways to protect the environment through environmental 
tax regulation which do not damage the fundamental rights of the tax-payer. Furthermore, excessive 
taxes normally prove to be ineffective in terms of environmental protection.
99. This is why raising our voices against the current environmental tax regulation should not 
be considered unethical or immoral, especially since fiscal excesses may involve a violation of the tax-
payer fundamental rights. Besides, this in turn frequently involves an infringement of the material prin-
ciples of tax justice. What may well be unethical or immoral is the attempt to camouflage behind alleged 
environmental goals what only intends to generate tax revenue. In order to do this, certain services and 
goods, which the tax-payer finds almost impossible to do without, are heavily taxed, leaving them with 
no real alternatives. 
100. The environmental policies of Governments should move beyond environmental tax re-
gulation, or at least should not have the latter as the main actor in the process, since this has not proved 
effective in fighting climate change.
101. The powers that be cannot charge tax-payers with an imaginary ethical component based 
on false environmental extra-taxation. What has been unethical is law-makers’ attitude, which under 
cover of an alleged environmental aim have been simply trying to obtain easy revenue. The best envi-
ronmental tax is the one which does not yield any revenue, because this would mean that no polluting 
taxable event or activity has taken place. If the revenue obtained from taxing a given behaviour or acti-
vity detrimental to the environment is small, we can consider it a success because it would involve that 
the activity in question, which would have damaged the environment, has been rare. However, this is not 
the idea guiding the law maker when they qualify as extra-fiscal taxes the purpose of which is not really 
to protect the environment but to collect revenue.
102. Consequently, governments should explore ways to protect the environment and to fight 
climate change which go way beyond tax-collection, reducing the presence and importance of current 
environmental tax-regulation, which has proved to be, so far, useless.
103. Is it ethical to charge the citizens with taxes of an apparently environmental nature, when 
they have no other option but to employ fossil fuel vehicles? Le tus think, for instance, in those citizens 
living in rural areas, away in the mountains, far from major urban centers. Would it be ethical to treat 
them in the same way than those inhabiting big cities? From a purely technical fiscal perspective, the 
treatment in both cases should be the same, but the former would be greatly harmed since we would be 
dealing with an indirect taxation on a specific consumption that they cannot escape or avoid.
104. Couldn’t we consider positive, from an environmental perspective, to avoid measures da-
maging those inhabiting rural areas which should not be abandoned? Not only from a fiscal perspective 
but from a moral or ethical one, both in an individual and a collective sense, it is necessary to deeply 
revise the standard parameters employed in environmental tax regulation, or in that tax regulation which 
is only apparently environmental. 
XII. Courses of Action
1. State Level
105. Apart from what is determined in every State’s constitutional law, if the national legislator 
acts wisely enough in order not to run into over-taxation, situations of apparent violation of material 
principles of tax justice could be avoided. It is true that when we deal with harmonized taxes according 
to the European Union directives, when these directives establish a minimum amount for the States to 
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apply as a tariff rate or as charges, and when the State law adjusts to the compulsory limit, the European 
Union –and not the relevant Member State—would take responsibility for the possible extra-taxation.
106. On the other hand, it is also true that the Unanimity Rule is legislated in the (community) 
production regulations, regarding taxes. Therefore, in order to adopt a tax harmonization directive it 
will have been necessary that every Member State, through their government representatives, has pre-
viously agreed to the adoption of the directive in question. Just one Member State opposing to it in the 
Council of Ministers would be enough to prevent the tax harmonization directive from being passed. A 
certainly different matter would be the political pressures that, not legally but factually, some Member 
States may decide to use upon others to influence their decisions regarding the adoption of a directive 
submitted by the EU Commission.  In any case, the EU would be imputed for any over-taxation caused 
by a minimum set through a tax harmonization directive: a minimum to be applied by member States in 
the corresponding harmonized tax.
107. If, formally, the responsibility would correspond to the EU, we must not forget what has been 
explained regarding the Unanimity Rule that articulates EU Law and is required to pass any tax harmoniza-
tion directive. In this sense, each and every member State would equally be responsible, on a second level, 
for having agreed in the Council to the approval of the directive. Consequently, it should not simply be a 
political and economic assessment what every Government must make before making explicit its consent 
to the application of a directive, but also a legal one, taking into consideration the material principles of tax 
justice, mostly from the status of those same principles in the State’s Constitutional practice.
108. Whenever the State’s national legislation establishes, for harmonized taxes, a tax rate supe-
rior to the minimum set in the Community’s tax harmonization directives, considerably more attention 
should be paid. The reason is that the responsibility for that excess will correspond exclusively to the 
States. The latter will have to make sure that the excess over the Community’s minimum does not violate 
its Constitutional principles of tax justice.
109. In this process of regulatory creation, States must keep in mind that taking into considera-
tion the protection of environmental constitutional interests through extra-fiscality cannot, in any way, 
totally cancel the –also constitutional- principles of tax justice. And, in connection with these same 
principles, we cannot forget either that their interpretation according to constitutional jurisprudence is 
almost more relevant than the literal transposition of those principles in the Constitutional text. A detai-
led description of such principles is of little use without a committed intervention of the Constitutional 
Court of each State, an intervention which should be willing to define and specify these principles.
2. European Union Level
110. According to all the above, the best option would be that, in a future reform of either the 
Treaty of the European Union or, more simply, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 
the material principles of tax justice, to be taken into consideration by fiscal harmonization directives, 
were explicitly included. Since the fiscal competences of the European Union mostly fall upon indirect 
taxation, the specificities of the latter within the field of tax justice should be considered. 
111. In the meantime, we cannot but deeply explore the field of Fundamental Rights in the EU, 
mostly through a redefinition of the right to property also addressed towards indirect taxation. 
112. Likewise, European Union institutions must improve their production of fiscal legislation, 
striving for the utmost coherence when combining extra-fiscal environmental criteria with those of com-
petition among States and with the material principles of tax justice. Neither the imperative application of 
a set of criteria, nor the application of others, may cancel the effects of the principles of tax justice, much 
less in those cases in which they stem from fundamental rights included within Community discipline.
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113. European Union institutions should make possible to visualize, with more clarity and trans-
parency, which are the specific criteria inspiring each tax harmonization directive, and they should also 
build the latter making sure it coheres with those criteria; the limits that cannot be left void of content 
cannot be ignored, though.  
114. Besides, in the European Union, to the effects here seen, to recall that there is such a thing 
as the principle of proportionality would be in order.11
XIII. Case-Law Considerations
115. I have already suggested that the interpretation and introduction of the principles of tax 
justice in the Constitutional jurisprudence of each one of the member States of the EU may be as impor-
tant as the description or consideration of these principles within those same Constitutions. The letter of 
each one of the Constitutions is as important as the interpretation that the Constitutional Courts of each 
member state makes of the aforementioned principles.
116. The actual form of the description in writing of such principles will depend on the scope 
and reach of the social dimension that constitutionally articulates each State as well as on the extent of 
the tradition of its socio-economic policies.
117. Occasionally, in those States whose Constitutions hardly make any reference to the princi-
ples of tax or fiscal justice we may, on the other hand, find Constitutional jurisprudence which has made 
a useful and coherent description of those principles. Sometimes this is achieved through the introduction 
in the Constitution of a fundamental right, such as, for instance, the right to property. In this sense, we 
can mention, as a relevant example, related pronouncements of the Constitutional Court of Germany.12
118. On the other hand, a highly detailed Constitutional description of the principles of tax justice 
is sometimes not adequately accompanied by a sufficient Constitutional jurisprudence. Spanish Constitu-
tional jurisprudence is a good case in point. Thus, although the Spanish Constitution explicitely mentions 
in Section 31.1 progressive taxation, explaining that it will not be of a confiscatory scope, and in Section 
33 it describes the right to private property, the Constitutional Court of Spain, even when it had the op-
portunity to do it, has not clarified from which percentage taxation is considered to become confiscatory.13
119. Furthermore, it went as far as uttering the truism that income tax should be considered 
confiscatory whenever its rate of taxation reaches one hundred per cent:14 It did not even refer to the top 
marginal rate, which –after all- would have still been a platitude.
120. If we go from the Constitutional jurisprudence of the UE member States to that of the Court 
of Justice of the European Union, the shortcomings of existing case-law become much more apparent. 
To a certain extent this could be explained as a consequence of the non-existence of –as we saw- an 
explicit reference to such principles neither in the Treaty on the European Union nor in the Treaty re-
gulating its functioning. In any case, and as we could see, the right to property is explicitely referred to 
and set forth within the area of fundamental rights in European Union Law. Let us remember that some 
11  Section 5 of the Treaty of the European Union.
12  See its 22 June 1995 ruling setting a fifty per cent limit on direct taxation. For further analysis see the above mentioned 
p.M. herrera Molina.
13  To exemplify these ideas we may mention the following legal basis of some Rulings by the Spanish Constitutional 
Court: legal ground 11 of the 14/1998 Ruling of 22 January; legal ground 23 of the 233/1999 Ruling of 16 December; legal 
ground 11 of the Ruling 194/2000 of 19 July; or legal ground 2 of the Ruling 26/2017 of 16 February.
14  Indeed, the Constitutional Court of Spain, in legal ground 9 of the Ruling 150/1990 of 4 October, specifically argues that 
«the confiscatory effects of a an Income Tax with a progressivity that reached 100%» would become apparent.
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material principles of tax justice could be inferred from this Right, just as the Constitutional jurispru-
dence of some States have done.
121. Having explained the above, it must be emphasized that the Court of Justice of the Euro-
pean Union did not make a pronouncement on the potential excess of some tax rates when it had the 
chance, sorting out the case through other procedures. We can recall, for instance, a case in which the 
Court of Justice was considering the taxing of vehicle registration in Denmark with a tax rate of 180 
per cent15, together with the general taxing of each vehicle by the VAT. It is also true that the Court of 
Justice was not dealing with a tax harmonized according to EU regulations but, still, there were reasons 
for this Court to take cognizance of this case –as it did- although it eventually decided not to deal with 
all the possibilities it offered.
122. Leaving aside all of the above in connection with a non-harmonized tax, we must add 
to everything discussed so far the complexity proper to harmonized taxes according to EU directives, 
which are mostly indirect taxes. Let us remember –as we have suggested- that doctrine and jurispruden-
ce regarding material principles of tax justice are far more developed, at a State level, in relation with 
direct taxes than they are with indirect taxes.
123. Likewise, we must be clear that –as we have already seen- harmonized taxes move across 
the aforementioned line of alleged justification from an environmental perspective. This activates the 
already mentioned related extra-fiscal files which, although including some complexity, cannot ignore 
or empty of significance traditional principles of tax justice.16
124. From the standpoint of tax harmonization, the relation among extra-fiscal environmental 
protection, free fiscal competition among States and the search of material tax justice, it entails as we 
could see a triple dimension which although difficult to coordinate must be faced in a coherent way.
125. Yet, beyond tax harmonization, the presence of the right to property within the European 
list of fundamental rights opens new opportunities for the Court of Justice of the European Union, pro-
tected by other potential Community implications, to go beyond strictly harmonized taxes according to 
EU directives.
126. To be sure, in relation with the fiscal relevance of fundamental rights –even from a mate-
rial point of view- the progress of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights17 is more 
remarkable than that of the Court of Justice of the European Union. 
15  The Court of Justice of the European Union, in the Sentence of 17 June 2003 (Case C-383/01) made a pronouncement on a 
preliminary ruling regarding the Lov om registreringsafgift af motorkoretojer (Dannish Law on Vehicle Registration) in its codified 
versión on 14 April 1999. This preliminary ruling dealt with the tax accrued upon the first registration of the vehicle on Dannish 
territory, with a tax rate of 105% on the first tax bracket, and 180% over the rest of the total price. The Court of Justice settled 
this preliminary ruling according to the principle of the free circulation of goods, given the prohibition that a member State taxes, 
either directly or indirectly, the products of the other member States with internal taxes exceeding those taxing directly or indirectly 
similar national products. This particular case stemmed from the lack of national vehicle production in Denmark. Yet, the Court 
of Justice established through its sentence that the free circulation of goods had not been disrupted by the aforementioned tax.
16  Now a reference to some rulings by the Constitutional Court of Spain seems to be in order. This Court has asserted that the 
establishment of «taxes of a mostly extra-fiscal nature» can only be implemented «respecting the demands and principles stem-
ming directly from the Constitution (art. 31)». In this sense, see legal ground 13 of the Ruling 37/1987, of 26 March. Likewise, 
see legal ground 4 of the Ruling 186/1993, of 7 June. Among the demands and principles mentioned, that of not being allowed 
to create confiscatory situations should be included. It is remarkable that the Constitutional Court of Spain specifically states 
that extra-fiscal taxes also have to respect the material principles of tax justice. Yet, it is nonetheless questionable, in connection 
with these rulings and as we also saw in relation to others, that the legal reasons exposed did mention confiscation in fiscal issues 
only to reject that it occurred in the cases studied; the Court, on its part, did not bother to explain in these rulings when taxes may 
become confiscatory.
17  On the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the balance between the right to property and 
the fiscal interest of the State, see M. poGGioli, Indicatori di forza economica e prelievo confiscatorio, Padova, CEDAM, 2012, 
pp. 181-184.
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127. In this sense, it should be emphasized that a Court not belonging to the institutions of 
the European Union, such as the European Court of Human Rights, has even made a pronouncement 
regarding the tax percentages of a member State of the EU, establishing whether they are excessive or 
illegitimate.18
XIV. Final considerations
128. It is quite difficult to combine these four concepts or ideas, namely: indirect taxes, princi-
ples of tax justice, fundamental rights –or even human rights- and, lastly, environmental extra-taxation. 
Most approaches have neglected the analysis of the relations among these four concepts. But, at the 
same time, jurisprudence has not attempted either to clarify them, especially when given the chance to 
specify in some detail this legal situation. It has, instead, tried to sort some of these issues out through 
other more limited interpretive devices. 
129. We are persuaded that the European Union Court of Justice should play a major role here, 
especially since the more important indirect taxes, such as VAT and excise duties, are harmonized ac-
cording to EU directives and through the shaping of some of these duties environmental purposes are 
aimed at. All the above with the additional burden of having to determine what are the limits of a true 
articulation in terms of environmental issues, and when we start to deal with an attempt to avoid free 
fiscal competition issues among States.
 
130. Within European Union Law we find various areas related with fiscal issues: firstly, we find 
community fiscal harmonization, which attempts to bring together the fiscal legislation of different mem-
ber States in various fields. Then, we have the resources of the Community itself, which constitute a 
source of funding for the EU. Lastly, we have the cooperation in the implementation of taxes which the 
Community’s institutions impose on all member States. This final area of European Union Law, that is, 
this obligation to cooperate among different fiscal institutions sometimes has an effect on the Community´s 
own taxes, and sometimes on harmonized State taxes. This means that this cooperation could be included 
within one of the two areas previously mentioned: either that of the Community’s own resources of a fiscal 
nature, or that of fiscal harmonization. Yet, this regulatory action by the EU, which consists on imposing 
upon the member States the duty to cooperate among them in order to apply taxes, occasionally affects 
taxes which are neither part of the EU’s own resources nor harmonized taxes according to directives of the 
Community. In this sense, we would be facing another, third, area different from the previous ones. This 
will be so unless we understand we are carrying out the fiscal harmonization on a formal level, that is, not 
in terms of the material or essential nature of the tax, but of their effective, or formal, application.
 
131. Out of the various fields pointed out in the above, the quandary of the principles of tax 
justice within European Union Law basically affects the area of fiscal harmonization, although it may 
well also have an impact on some specific fiscal tools of the European Union, such as customs duties. 
However, when giving shape to these the priority should be, for its own nature, the protection of the 
common market against those goods coming from overseas, non-EU, markets.
18  In this sense we may, for instance, refer to a case related to Hungary. This State imposed a special taxation on rents based 
on compensations for cessation of work in the public sector, taxing at a rate of 98 percent the amount exceeding the equivalent 
of (Hungary does not have the euro) approximately 12,000€. Because of this, without limiting the foregoing, the European 
Court of Human Rights, through its ruling of 14 May 2013, condemned Hungary for violating, through this fiscal measure, the 
right to private property.
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